___________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
Over the past decade much criticism has been levelled at corporations for paying executives excessive non-performance-linked remuneration (Boyd and Clegg, 2002; Hill and Yablon, 2002) . The recent financial crisis has intensified these criticisms, leading to calls for further regulatory intervention (Hepworth and Durkin, 2008) . In the past, regulatory intervention has primarily focused on enhancing the mandatory disclosures in annual reports. Ideally annual report disclosures should provide shareholders with sufficient information to evaluate the appropriateness of executive remuneration practices. Disclosures can be particularly informative for more complex remuneration arrangements involving executive stock option (ESO) plans where the potential for large rewards are considerable. However, where remuneration practices appear excessive or reduce a company's competitive advantage, executives have incentives to provide opaque disclosures and withhold sensitive information.
As there is little known about these disclosure practices, we examine ESO disclosure compliance by Australian listed companies and focus on the role of corporate governance in influencing compliance with the disclosure of sensitive ESO information.
The Australian regulatory setting is a particularly interesting one in which to examine ESO disclosure compliance. Between 2001 and 2004 numerous controversial amendments were introduced in Australia to align its ESO disclosure standards with international best practice. 1 We consider two research questions arising from the above motivations: (1) what is the nature and extent of compliance with ESO disclosure requirements in annual reports and do they change over time, in particular, do firms withhold significantly more sensitive ESO disclosures, compared to non-sensitive ESO disclosures?; and (2) how does corporate governance influence compliance with ESO disclosures? As in prior studies, we construct comprehensive disclosure indices to test disclosure compliance. However, we also develop a separate disclosure index for sensitive ESO disclosure items (value and price-related option information).
In answer to the first research question, our study reveals that companies increased ESO disclosure compliance from 73 percent to 83 percent over the study period. Interestingly, a detailed examination of the nature of the non-disclosed items reveals that firms were significantly more likely to withhold the more sensitive value and price-related option information, compared to the non-sensitive information. Importantly, lower compliance with these sensitive items is masked in a simple analysis of aggregate disclosure scores.
In answer to our second question, our findings indicate that internal governance mechanisms, including board independence and audit committee independence and effectiveness, explain ESO disclosure compliance (with both overall and sensitive items).
Additionally, compensation committee independence and effectiveness explains compliance with sensitive disclosures but not overall compliance. With regard to external governance mechanisms, external auditor quality and regulatory intervention in the form of new and more comprehensive disclosure regulations, as well as corporate regulators' guidance and enforcement actions, successfully enhance overall compliance. Shareholder activism is also associated with lower overall compliance, but no association is evident with sensitive disclosures.
This study makes several important contributions. It is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nature and extent of statutory ESO disclosures by Australia's largest corporations. Importantly, the findings indicate that companies appear to be reluctant to disclose sensitive information, which is not evident in aggregated disclosure analysis.
Second, the study provides evidence that internal and external corporate governance is important in explaining compliance with ESO disclosures. In particular, we show that shareholder activism and the independence and effectiveness of the compensation committee are important influencing factors in ESO disclosure decisions. Third, the findings provide evidence that compliance has increased over time, indicating that the efforts by corporate regulators and standards setters to enhance financial reporting have been effective in improving compliance with ESO disclosure obligations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and theory pertinent to ESO disclosures and develops the hypotheses. The sample, data, and the research design are outlined in section 3. Section 4 reports the descriptive statistics on ESO disclosure compliance and results of the univariate and multivariate tests. Robustness tests are reported in section 5 and the paper concludes in Section 6 with a summary and discussion of the findings.
Theoretical background and hypotheses

Disclosure overview
It is widely acknowledged that, due to information asymmetry, capital markets will not function efficiently or fairly without regulatory intervention (Cooper and Keim, 1983) . While a policy of full disclosure can mitigate the information asymmetry problem, managers often have incentives to suppress or distort public disclosures (Beaver, 1998) . 2 face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosure. Regulatory intervention aims to redress the reluctance of managers to reveal information and reduce the information gap between informed and uninformed investors by ensuring a minimum level of disclosure to investors and other stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). However, an increasing body of literature shows that managers exercise considerable discretion in their compliance with disclosure regulation (Clarkson et al. 2006; Morris et al. 2004; Nelson and Percy, 2005; Nelson and Percy, 2008; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Street and Gray, 2002; Taplin et al. 2002; Tower et al. 1999 ). This lack of compliance suggests that even in the presence of high quality accounting regulations, disclosures may be sub-optimal, particularly where management has incentives to avoid compliance (Ball et al. 2003) , and where regulatory enforcement and corporate governance are weak.
Disclosure of statutory stock option information
Despite the controversial nature of ESO disclosures, relevant literature is limited to a small number of studies. UK studies by Conyon et al. (2002) and Forker (1992) find evidence of an association between stock option disclosures and certain board characteristics, but they do not comprehensively examine the influence of governance characteristics on the extent of compliance, or examine the disclosure of sensitive ESO information. Nelson and Percy (2005) factors, or whether disclosures improved after 2002. 3 Given that the disclosure of ESO information is controversial, in that ESOs can result in potentially large wealth transfers to managers, it can be expected that firms have incentives not to disclose ESO information that is considered more sensitive. Hence, we expect that by dividing ESO disclosures into sensitive and non-sensitive disclosures, we will find compliance with sensitive disclosures to be lower. This expectation is summarised in the following hypothesis:
Interestingly, Bassett et al. (2007) extend Nelson and Percy (2005) to employee stock options and find, for 2003, a higher level of compliance (75 percent) for these disclosures. However, they do not investigate why compliance is higher for employee, as opposed to executive, stock options. One possibility is that managers may be more willing to disclose information about employees, as compared to executives, due to the sensitive nature of ESO information. By avoiding the disclosure of sensitive items, managers may be attempting to avoid unwelcome remuneration scrutiny by shareholders.
H1: Companies are more likely to be forthcoming with non-sensitive ESO disclosures than sensitive ESO disclosures.
While firms may be reluctant to disclose sensitive ESO information, other characteristics can influence disclosure compliance, such as corporate governance. As outlined above, the disclosure compliance research is inconclusive on the impact of corporate governance and regulatory enforcement on the disclosure of sensitive executive remuneration information.
However, governance structures should ensure that agency costs are minimised and stakeholders receive reliable information about the value of their investment in the firm (Bushman and Smith, 2003) . Regulatory intervention in the form of disclosure regulations act as an external governance mechanism and is likely to lead to more effective shareholder monitoring in circumstances where managers have incentives to withhold information (Ferrarini and Moloney, 2005) . Thus, we expect that both effective regulation and effective corporate governance mechanisms are pre-conditions for ensuring useful corporate disclosure about sensitive ESO information.
The role of internal corporate governance
Following prior research, three aspects of internal governance are likely to directly or indirectly impact on compliance with ESO disclosure obligations: (a) board independence and effectiveness, (b) audit committee independence and effectiveness, and (c) compensation committee independence and effectiveness.
(a) Board independence and effectiveness
Governance research views the board of directors as being the "lynchpin of corporate governance" (Gillan, 2006, p. 385) . Board independence (independent chairperson and a majority of independent directors on the board) is almost universally viewed as a desirable governance characteristic. When the roles of CEO and chairperson are combined, agency problems may arise because the one person has the ability, and the influence, to opportunistically distort the information flow to outsiders (Ho and Wong, 2001; Yermack, 1996) . Similarly, a larger proportion of independent directors on the board are more effective in monitoring management because they are less aligned to management (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Empirical research generally supports these claims. CEO duality is found to be associated with lower quality disclosure (Bassett et al. 2007; Cheng and Courtnay, 2006; Forker, 1992) and greater board independence is found to be associated with more comprehensive statutory disclosures and greater disclosure of stock option information (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Conyon et al., 2002) . Hence, we expect the independence of a company's board of directors is positively associated with ESO disclosures.
In prior studies the effectiveness of the board is often examined by reference to its structure (size) and activity (frequency of meetings) (Gillan, 2006) . While a board's monitoring ability increases with board size, the benefits may be negated by the incremental cost of less effective communication and reduced decision making capabilities associated with larger groups (John and Senbet, 1998) . In analysing the effectiveness of small boards, Yermack (1996) finds a negative relation between board size and firm value. In contrast, Bradbury et al. (2006) find a positive relation between board size and high accounting quality.
Findings for board activity are less equivocal. Vafeas (1999) shows that boards that meet more frequently outperform those that meet less frequently. Although not previously addressed in disclosure research, we expect that boards that meet more frequently are more effective in ensuring corporate compliance with mandatory ESO disclosure obligations.
(b) Audit committee independence and effectiveness
The independence of the audit committee is claimed to be a necessary requirement for the committee to be able to carry out its responsibilities objectively (Abbott et al. 2004; Felo et al. 2003) . As a consequence, financial reporting quality is expected to be of a higher standard in the presence of an independent audit committee. Research in various contexts (e.g. Bradbury et al., 2006; Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Wright, 1996) supports this association. Hence, we also expect that the independence of a company's audit committee is positively associated with ESO disclosures.
As with board effectiveness, audit committee structure (size) and activity (meeting frequency) are claimed to contribute to better corporate governance. Recent evidence also suggests that expertise (the accounting experience of the audit committee) contributes to better governance. Consistent with these claims Felo et al. (2003) find that larger audit committees positively influence financial reporting quality. Anderson et al. (2004) find that audit committee size is inversely related to the firm's cost of debt, which they attribute to the influence of the committee size on disclosure transparency. For firms with more active audit committees, Abbott et al. (2004) and Naiker and Navissi (2005) find evidence of higher quality financial reporting. Also, Felo et al. (2003) , and Naiker and Navissi (2005) report that the accounting experience of the audit committee is positively associated with higher quality financial reporting and accounting. We therefore expect the level of audit committee effectiveness (size, activity, and expertise) is positively associated with ESO disclosures.
(c) Compensation committee independence and effectiveness
The compensation committee is responsible for evaluating management's performance and creating appropriate remuneration packages. In determining the nature and amount of compensation for company executives, compensation committees can help alleviate agency problems by constructing and implementing incentive schemes that are designed to align the goals of senior management with those of shareholders (Uzun et al. 2004) . While the existence of a compensation committee appears to influence ESO disclosures (Nelson and Percy, 2005) , there is no known disclosure research that specifically examines the effectiveness of the compensation committee on company disclosures. 4 However, compensation committee independence and effectiveness is likely to be a strong influence for a number of reasons. First, a more independent compensation committee is less aligned to management and hence, is more likely to encourage more transparent disclosures. Second, a more active compensation committee is better able to monitor the appropriateness of the remuneration packages more frequently. Third, a larger compensation committee has more resources to construct, evaluate, and monitor the compensation packages of senior management and ensure the alignment with the goals of the shareholders and performance of the company. Thus, an independent and effective compensation committee should engender a remuneration environment where management have few incentives to withhold ESO information.
In summary, it is expected that board, audit, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are positively associated with the level of compliance with ESO disclosure obligations (both overall and those items classified as sensitive disclosure items). These expectations are summarised in the following hypothesis: 
The role of external corporate governance
In addition to the internal corporate governance mechanisms of a company, external mechanisms are created by independent parties to act as a form of external monitoring of the company. It is expected that increased monitoring will result in reduced information asymmetry and lower agency costs, thereby increasing compliance with ESO disclosures.
External monitors of company behaviour include, external auditors, those acting on behalf of shareholders, and corporate regulators.
(a) External auditor size
It is frequently argued that larger audit firms invest more than smaller audit firms to maintain their reputation as providers of quality audits. As a consequence, larger audit firms are more likely to exert a greater influence over a company's disclosure and compliance practices than smaller audit firms (Owusu-Ansah, 2005) . Consistent with these arguments numerous studies find a positive association between auditor size (as measured by the "Big-N/non-Big-N" dichotomy) and disclosure compliance (Bassett et al. 2007; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Street and Gray, 2002) . Similar, we expect a positive association between audit firm size and ESO disclosure compliance.
(b) Shareholder activism
Shareholder activism represents an external governance mechanism that often arises in response to poor governance by boards of directors (Gillan and Starks, 1998) . The Australian Shareholders' Association (ASA) is a shareholder activist organisation that monitors annual reports and other disclosures for the largest Australian listed companies and challenges companies that do not act in the best interests of their shareholders.
(c) Regulatory intervention
The ASA focuses particularly on questioning poor financial performers who inappropriately reward executives with higher remuneration, including ESOs. Managers of poor-performing companies therefore have incentives to avoid ASA scrutiny by providing opaque or non-compliant ESO disclosures. Therefore, those firms classified as poor performers by the ASA are expected to produce a lower level of ESO disclosure compliance than non-poor performers. 
Sample, data, and research design
Sample and data
The sample is sourced from the Standard and Poor's Australian Securities Exchange ( where reports were available, which clearly highlights the popularity of this type of compensation among the larger Australian companies. To ensure sample homogeneity across the study period for testing and comparative purposes, firms were deleted if they: were not listed for the full four-year study period (38 firms); did not have a 30 June financial year end (49 firms); were listed as a trust (20 firms); or, were domiciled in a foreign country (4). A final sample of 115 firms met these criteria. These reports were manually searched for ESO compliance information to construct the dependent variable. Data for the independent variables were also sourced from company annual reports with the exception of the ASA shareholder activism variable, which was sourced from Equity, the quarterly journal published by the ASA.
Measurement of ESO disclosure compliance
Consistent with prior research, the extent of compliance with ESO disclosures is measured using disclosure indices. 7 An overall compliance score is calculated for all applicable regulations (pooled) for each year of the study period. In order to derive a score out of one (or 100 percent) for each firm, the number of items disclosed, that is, items coded as one in the index are added together. The total number of statutory disclosures identified is then divided by the total possible number of statutory disclosures.
These indices (for overall and sensitive items) consist of requirements in AASB1028 (1995 , AASB1017, AASB1046, and s.300 (1)(d) Where an item is not applicable to a particular company, the company is not penalised.
Instead, that item is not included in the calculation of the final index score. 8 Similarly, for each year, a sensitive-item score is derived from the overall statutory disclosure item list. The process used to identify sensitive items follows the findings of Percy (2005, 2008) . Their findings provide evidence of firms' reluctance to disclose certain statutory, price-related ESO information in 2000 and 2002. These disclosure items, which included the amount, price, and value of option information were the most contentious in the commentary period prior to the introduction of the standards and as a result, were expected to be the most costly to comply with following the introduction of the This method of calculating compliance scores allows for all items within the disclosure index to be weighted equally.
standards. Appendix B provides a full list of all the disclosure items included in the overalland sensitive-item disclosure indices.
Based on these indices two dependent variables are created: (1) the extent of overall disclosure (COMPLNCE) and (2) the extent of sensitive disclosure (SENSCOMP). Research question one (nature and extent of compliance) and research question two (effect of corporate governance) are examined using both dependent variables.
Measurement of corporate governance
Consistent with prior research, corporate governance variables are initially identified and measured as follows: 
Hypothesis testing procedures
To determine the nature and extent of compliance with ESO disclosures (research question one), we examine the summary statistics of the dependent variables, overall compliance (COMPLNCE) and sensitive compliance (SENSCOMP). Statistical tests of differences between the sensitive and non-sensitive compliance scores are performed to test hypothesis 1.
We then formally investigate hypotheses 2 and 3 using multivariate regression procedures to test the corporate governance factors that may influence ESO disclosures and to answer research question two.
To measure the effect of internal corporate governance on the extent of ESO compliance (hypothesis 2), we follow Larcker et al. (2007) by using principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the large number of highly collinear internal governance variables into factors that identify the underlying dimensions of corporate governance. As reported in Table 1 , the significant correlations among most of the individual governance variables strongly support the PCA approach.
[INSERT Table 2 ).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The factor scores from each of the four factors identified in Table 2 are then used in a regression model to examine the effect of internal governance (hypothesis 2). The effect of external governance (hypothesis 3) is examined using the individual variables, AUDITOR, POORPER, and REGINTVN in a multivariate regression model. (Gujurati, 2003) . The results are consistent with the GLS regression. 11 The rejection of a fixed effects model (following the Hausman test results) led to the application of a random effects generalised least squares (GLS) regression model to test the panel data.
reactions have resulted in severe declines in share prices for some companies (Hill and Yablon, 2002) . Consequently, executives have incentives to limit remuneration disclosures where the remuneration may be perceived as excessive in comparison with other companies.
Hence, we expect relative CEO remuneration (CEOREMUN) to be negatively associated with the level of compliance with ESO disclosures.
Companies that are more highly leveraged incur more monitoring costs and attempt to reduce these costs through increased disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . However, Jensen (1986) argues that increased leverage is expected to reduce disclosure because leverage helps to control the free cash-flow problem, and the agency costs of debt are controlled through restrictive covenants in debt agreements rather than through increased disclosure. Accordingly, Jensen finds an inverse association between debt and disclosure.
Also, Eng and Mak (2003) and Hossain et al. (1995) Disclosure studies frequently document an association between disclosure and company size (Ho and Wong, 2001; Nelson and Percy, 2005; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005) , and firm performance (including both profitability and loss-making status) (Coulton et al. 2003; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Taplin et al., 2002) . We expect similar factors are associated with the ESO disclosure compliance in our study. [INSERT (1995) . As for the year-by-year results, the comparative t-tests for each regulation further demonstrate that managers choose to selectively disclose sensitive option information.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The Table 4 results for non-sensitive disclosures (NONSENS) reveal a high level of compliance across all regulations, suggesting a willingness on the part of companies to disclose this type of information. In contrast, sensitive disclosures exhibit poor compliance, with AASB1028 (1995) as low as 25 percent. Consistent with hypothesis 1, firms' compliance with sensitive disclosures is lower than that of non-sensitive disclosures across all years and regulations. Notably, this low compliance is not immediately evident upon investigation of the overall disclosure scores, indicating that these low compliance scores are being masked by the higher overall compliance.
Multivariate test results
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that internal and external governance mechanisms, respectively, are associated with a higher level of ESO disclosure compliance for both overall and sensitive items. Table 5 presents the pooled results of estimating the model used to test hypotheses 2 and 3 for the full study period. 13 The following discussion focuses on the results for the overall compliance model, and where significantly different, the results for the sensitive and non-sensitive disclosure models are contrasted and explained.
14 13 The models were also estimated separately on a year-by-year basis. The untabulated results are consistent with the pooled results but are generally weaker due to the smaller sample size across years (n=115). 14 Untabulated correlation results indicate several statistically significant, but no high correlations among the non-governance independent variables. Also, White's tests revealed no evidence of heteroskedasticity in the data.
Internal corporate governance (H2)
Contrary to expectation, the board independence (BRDINDP) coefficient is negative (-0.019) and significant (p<0.01). BRDINDP captures chairman independence and the proportion of non-executives on the board. While this result is contrary to expectation, it suggests that where companies lack chairperson and board independence, companies mitigate the agency problems associated with this lack of independence by providing more ESO disclosures. The board activity (BRDACTY) coefficient is not significant.
[INSERT 
External corporate governance (H3)
The external auditor quality (AUDITOR) coefficient is positive (0.058) and significant (p<0.05). Consistent with the hypothesis, it appears that there is evidence of a Big-4 auditor reputation effect, and these auditors encourage higher overall compliance. However, this result appears to be driven by the non-sensitive rather than the sensitive disclosures. Hence, it
indicates that external auditors may not be as effective in monitoring such specific types of disclosure; rather focusing their efforts on ensuring companies disclose a reasonable amount of ESO information in general.
Companies identified by the ASA as poor performers disclosed less of the required information for ESOs with the POORPER coefficient being negative (-0.051) and significant (p<0.05).
16
15 Providing further support for this conclusion, untabulated results using the individual corporate governance variables, instead of the governance factors in the regression models, show that a less independent Chairperson is associated with greater overall and non-sensitive disclosures. A decline in audit committee meetings is associated with greater non-sensitive disclosures, while an increase in compensation committee meetings is associated with an increase in non-sensitive disclosures. Larger audit committees are more likely to exhibit greater overall, sensitive, and non-sensitive disclosures.
This result suggests that the ASA's classification is successful in identifying those companies that may also be at risk of performing poorly in other areas of their operations, such as disclosure. Contrary to prediction, the POORPER coefficient is not significant for sensitive disclosures. However, the POORPER coefficient is significant (p<0.05) and negative (-0.056) for non-sensitive information. These results suggest that while poor performers disclose less non-sensitive information, they are disclosing similar levels of 16 Other ASA monitoring outcomes, including ESO practices considered sub-standard and various actions by companies considered detrimental to shareholders, were examined but were not found to be associated with disclosure levels.
sensitive information, as compared to non-poor performers. Perhaps these poor performers are attempting to divert attention away from their poor performance. The CEOREMUN coefficient is not significantly associated with nonsensitive disclosures, confirming that managers have greater incentives to withhold the sensitive ESO information when CEO remuneration levels are higher. Further, the results also indicate that companies with larger losses disclose less of the required information, evidenced by a negative (-0.078) and significant (p<0.01) LOSSPERF coefficient. This result complements the ASA poor performer result by confirming that companies that are 18 In sensitivity analysis, the regression models were re-estimated using year dummy variables to test for the changes in the extent of disclosure over the study period. The results (unreported) are consistent with those of the primary regressions. 19 Other forms of director remuneration are also used as alternatives to CEOREMUN, including total director remuneration, total director fees, and total director salary. These remuneration variables are not significant.
performing poorly disclose less information on ESOs. The insignificant coefficients on the other control variables included in the model (LEVERAGE, SIZE, PERFORM, and LOSS) indicate that these proxies have no influence on the level of disclosure compliance after controlling for the other factors previously discussed. 20
Robustness tests
A number of robustness tests are conducted to test the sensitivity of our results to potential biases in the measurement of the disclosure compliance and governance variables.
Alternate disclosure indices
Alternative disclosure indices were created by using only those disclosure items that remained constant over the period of this study. The untabulated results are consistent with those reported in Table 5 , with the exception that compensation committee independence and effectiveness (CCOMMEE), CEO remuneration (CEOREMUN), and firms making larger losses (LOSSPERF), are no longer significantly associated with sensitive disclosures. The lack of significance for these variables may be attributable to the reduced disclosure items 
Corporate governance indices
Initially, principal component analysis was used to develop a composite measure of internal corporate governance. To increase the credibility of the findings of this study from using this analysis, we conduct additional testing using a corporate governance index. Corporate 20 The variable LEVERAGE was also measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm size was also tested using market capitalisation as a proxy. The variable PERFORM was also tested using Return on Equity measured as (net profit minus preference dividends) divided by average ordinary shareholder's equity. The results show LEVERAGE, SIZE and PERFORM were not significant using these alternate measures. In sensitivity analysis, the inclusion of a dummy variable to control for cross-listing status in our models produced insignificant coefficient results in all regression tests and had no impact on previously reported findings. The insignificant results are potentially due to the small number of firms in our sample that are cross-listed. Following the prior research, we use both a self-constructed governance index and Horwath Report rankings. The self-created governance index is significantly associated with sensitive ESO disclosures, indicating that better governance structures are more likely to encourage improved disclosure of sensitive information. The untabulated results report that the Horwath index is not significant, possibly due to the reduced sample size from several firms not receiving a ranking from this index. These results suggest that commercially available indices may be too broad to capture the effect of corporate governance on compliance, whereas a self-created, more focused index may be more effective.
The impact of changes in governance characteristics
A change model is estimated to examine whether changes in corporate governance are associated with changes in compliance over time. Generally, the results (untabulated) are weaker than the main findings, possibly due to the small variation in governance variables from year-to-year. Also, the smaller sample size may have reduced the power of the model.
The changes model was estimated for changes on a year-by-year basis (n=345) and for changes from the beginning to the end of the sample period (n=115).
Summary and discussion
The investigation of the nature and extent of compliance with ESO disclosures has produced important revelations about companies' disclosure behaviour. In answer to research question one, overall, companies were not fully compliant with the statutory disclosures for ESOs even after the introduction of the new regulations and the intervention by ASIC, indicating that some companies are continuing to be selective in the disclosure of ESO information. On closer examination of the disclosure indices for each regulation, it was revealed that companies were significantly less likely to disclose the more sensitive price and value-related information about options, as compared to non-sensitive information. When total disclosure is examined, it was also apparent that the lower compliance for sensitive option information is masked by the overall higher compliance when disclosure scores were examined in aggregate.
In answer to research question two, internal governance factors, such as board independence are negatively and significantly associated with increased compliance with ESO
disclosures. There appears to be a substitution effect whereby firms mitigate the agency costs associated with this lack of independence by increasing ESO disclosures. Further, companies with more independent and effective audit committees are more likely to exhibit higher compliance. Interestingly, more independent and effective compensation committees are more likely to encourage greater compliance with sensitive ESO disclosures.
From the external governance perspective, the results show that shareholder activism has a negative and significant association with the level of overall compliance. However, poor performing companies appear to disclose similar levels of sensitive disclosures as non-poor performing companies, perhaps in an effort to direct attention away from the poor performance of the company. Further, the external auditor also acts as an effective monitor of the company's overall disclosure behaviour; but less effective at monitoring sensitive Applicable: 2001 Applicable: -2003 • Applied to directors only.
• Basic disclosures:
• Number of options acquired, disposed of, held, and terms of options.
• No measurement or recognition criteria specified. FY beginning on or after 1 July 2002 AASB 1028 'Employee Benefits' Applicable: 2003 Applicable: -2004 • Replaced AASB1028 (1994).
• Comprehensive disclosure requirements for details regarding options at beginning, during, and end of reporting period: • Replaced requirements of AASB1017.
• Applied to specified directors and specified executives.
• Comprehensive disclosures:
• Details of options granted, exercised, vested, and outstanding.
• Value of options granted must be disclosed • Measurement principles provided to enable option value to be calculated. *FY = Financial year; Applicable = years of study period requirements apply to. CEOCHAIR is coded as 2 for separate CEO/Chair and non-executive chair, 1 for separate CEO/Chair and executive chair, 0 otherwise (categorical); BRDSIZE is measured as total number of directors on the board (continuous); BRDINDP is measured as percentage of non-executive directors on the board (continuous); ACMEET is measured as the number of audit committee meetings held during the year (continuous); ACINDP is coded as 2 for 100 percent non-executive directors on audit committee (100 percent independence), 1 for any non-executive directors on audit committee (some independence), and 0 otherwise (no independence) (categorical); ACSIZE is coded as 3 for 4+ members on audit committee, 2 for 3 members on audit committee, 1 for 2 members on audit committee, and 0 otherwise (categorical); ACACCEXP is coded as 2 for 100 percent of directors with accounting expertise on audit committee, 1 for at least one director with accounting expertise on audit committee, and 0 otherwise (categorical); CCMTGS is the number of compensation committee meeting held during the year; CCSIZE is 3 for 4+ members on compensation committee, 2 for 3 members on compensation committee, 1 for 2 members on compensation committee, 0 otherwise; CCINDP is 2 for 100 percent nonexecutive directors on compensation committee (100 percent independence), 1 for any non-executive directors on compensation committee (some independence), 0 otherwise (no independence). Definitions: CEOCHAIR is 2 for separate CEO/Chair and non-executive chair, 1 for separate CEO/Chair and executive chair, 0 otherwise; BRDINDP is percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BRDSIZE is total number of directors on the board; BRDMTGS is the number of board meetings held during the year; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meetings held during the year; ACINDP is 2 for 100 percent non-executive directors on audit committee (100 percent independence), 1 for any non-executive directors on audit committee (some independence), and 0 otherwise (no independence); ACSIZE is 3 for 4+ members on audit committee, 2 for 3 members on audit committee, 1 for 2 members on audit committee, and 0 otherwise; ACACCEXP is 2 for 100 percent of directors with accounting expertise on audit committee, 1 for at least one director with accounting expertise on audit committee, and 0 otherwise; CCMTGS is the number of compensation committee meetings held during the year; CCSIZE is coded as 3 for 4+ members on compensation committee, 2 for 3 members on compensation committee, 1 for 2 members on compensation committee, and 0 otherwise; CCINDP is 2 for 100 percent non-executive directors on compensation committee (100 percent independence), 1 for any non-executive directors on compensation committee (some independence), and 0 otherwise (no independence); CEOREMUN is total CEO remuneration scaled by median of total CEO remuneration for all sample firms; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; PERFORM is return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets (ranked); POORPER is 1 for the year ASA identifies as poor performer, 0 otherwise; AUDITOR is 1 for Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; LOSS is 1 for loss, 0 otherwise. ˆ, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively. The z-statistic is derived using a random effects generalised least squares regression model. Alternative dependent variables: COMPLNCE is the identified number of statutory disclosures divided by total possible number of statutory disclosures; SENSCOMP is the identified number of sensitive disclosures divided by total possible number of sensitive disclosures; NONSENS is the identified number of non-sensitive disclosures divided by total possible number of non-sensitive disclosures. Independent variables: BRDINDP is the independence of the Board of Directors; BRDACTY is the number of board meetings; ACOMMEE is the independence and effectiveness of audit committee; CCOMMEE is the independence and effectiveness of the compensation committee; AUDITOR is 1 for Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise; POORPER is 1 for the year ASA identifies as poor performer, 0 otherwise; REGINTVN is 1 for 2002, 2 for 2003, 3 for 2004 (2001 is the base case and equals 0); CEOREMUN is total CEO remuneration scaled by median of total CEO remuneration for all sample firms; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; PERFORM is return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets (ranked); LOSS is 1 for loss and 0 otherwise; LOSSPERF is the loss dummy multiplied by performance.
